UNCLAMPING ‘PHILOSOPHY’ IN D. H. LAWRENCE

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I still remember being presented, as a first-year undergraduate, with a volume of Lawrence’s selected essays to study, and being astonished by them. The volume, first published by Penguin in 1950, contains an introduction in which Richard Aldington describes Lawrence as “a persistent metaphysical and reforming thinker.” What was striking about the essays was, as I thought then, their blending of an unusually high seriousness of philosophical purpose with a conversational style which testified, in Aldington’s words, to Lawrence’s “horror of pedantry and the university manner”. I didn’t know that ‘philosophy’ could be done in quite this way. I studied philosophy for the first two years of the degree, alongside literature and history, and throughout this time persisted in regarding Lawrence as a philosophical thinker; and as I continued to study his work at postgraduate level, I also largely continued to regard this identification of Lawrence with philosophy as self-evident and unproblematic. However, one cannot venture too far into Lawrence studies without becoming aware of a critical history that consistently suggests the dangers of this approach – dangers, that is, both of misconstruing the nature of Lawrence’s thought, and of bringing philosophy itself into disrepute. One critical issue which consistently began to surface in discussion with peers and mentors revolved around the proposition that Lawrence was not a philosopher because he was not capable of systematic thought.

Various factors have recently persuaded me to upgrade the question of Lawrence and philosophy from the status of a given to a methodology that requires critical attention. Firstly, I have reached the stage where I want to formalize and develop this interest in Lawrence and philosophy, in order to consolidate that longstanding
sense of a strong if idiosyncratic connection between the two. This in turn reflects a broader preoccupation with the relations between literature and philosophy vis-à-vis the current condition of literary studies as a discipline. In this context, the following kinds of factor come into play: a sense that philosophy might be the means of refreshing both the appeal and the seriousness of intent of the discipline of literary studies; a sense that the term ‘theory’ some time ago displaced various practices which might otherwise have been described in terms of the relationship between literature and philosophy; correspondingly, that ‘theory’ has led to certain pedagogical impasses which we might begin to dislodge through a re-description in terms of philosophy and literature; finally, and much more speculatively, a sense that the concept and practice of philosophy might be in the process of regaining wider legitimacy and interest as a means of addressing the particular problems of early twenty-first century modernity, for example in the realms of therapy or ecopolitics.

In his study The Dark Sun (1956), Graham Hough argued that “ideally the word ‘philosophy’ should always be in quotation marks” when applied to Lawrence, for “of course Lawrence is not a philosopher”. The proposal seemed to have stuck in Frank Kermode’s lively survey of Lawrence in 1973, where quotation marks remain duly clamped around the word in Lawrence’s case. Hough’s disqualification of Lawrence as a philosopher is based on the view that what makes a ‘vision’ philosophical is that it has been “corrected – checked for internal consistency and for consistency with the reports derived from other modes of experience than his own”. Hough maintains that Lawrence’s vision was merely personal, a Weltanschauung, and as such ‘philosophy’ would have to do as a loosely-convenient word, although ‘doctrine’, whilst having more repellent associations, would be equally appropriate.

In this hesitancy over the terms ‘philosophy’ and ‘doctrine’, Hough echoes a body of much earlier criticism, located in contemporaneous reviews of Lawrence’s work, where a general scepticism surrounding Lawrence’s status as a philosopher appears
already to be well-established. The meaning of philosophy in these
reviews is itself ambivalent, hovering between a consistent system
of ideas about the world, and an egotistical projection or doctrine of
animuses and prejudices, the only consensus being that neither of
these things ought to play a part in Lawrence’s art. Lawrence’s
wayward philosophical leanings tend to be figured in terms of a
dangerous or transgressive liquidity of content or of form. To the
extent that his works are about evolutionary downturn, “Mr
Lawrence”, writes a reviewer of The Lost Girl in 1920, “would
have us back to the slime from which we rose”, while for
Middleton Murry in 1921 Women in Love affirms “a thing that our
forefathers had rejected when they began to rise from the slime”; a
vision, that is, in which “man and woman are as indistinguishable
as octopods in an aquarium tank”. As early as 1911, an anonymous
reviewer of The White Peacock in the Athenaeum saw Lawrence’s
thoughts flowing “after the manner of a river, rapid from its source
which is in the mountains, taking its course to the sea with
windings which must be a scandal to the trained engineer”, while
for Richard Church in 1929, “Mr Lawrence, the human volcano, is
still in eruption, still pouring the lava of his philosophy of atavism
down the slopes of his towering personality, and annihilating the
cities erected by human convention, fear, and indolence”. Thus by
1924 it was already a “platitude”, according to E. B. C. Jones in the
Nation and Athenaeum, that “Mr Lawrence’s philosophy is like a
‘crate of smashed breakfast eggs’”. ³

Philosophy shouldn’t flow, then, because it reveals the thinker’s
indiscipline and lack of restraint, his vulnerability to bogus
suggestion – terms like “materialistic pseudophilosophy”, “esoteric
language” and “quack terminology” also tend to circulate in these
ey early commentaries – and because it thereby threatens to inundate
reasoned and civilized, progressive discourse. It is worth
highlighting here Middleton Murry, this time in 1922 on Aaron’s
Rod: “To talk of Mr Lawrence philosophizing at all is misleading;
he is not and never has been a philosopher: he is and always has
been a moralist” (though this after praising Lawrence’s philoso-
phizing in Aaron’s Rod because he approves of its “tackling a real problem and offering a real solution”). Murry thus closely anticipates not only Graham Hough’s position but also, of course, F. R. Leavis’s claim that Lawrence’s methods were “nowhere a philosopher’s”, the difference being that this is a relatively unambiguous tribute in Leavis’s critical universe.

So much, then, for a brief critical snapshot of Lawrence and philosophy. Recent trends in Lawrence criticism suggest a rather different story. Here we find various ways of accommodating Lawrence’s thought to, or reading him through the lens of, for example, Frankfurt School critical theory, psychoanalysis, post-structuralism, Levinasian ethics, and Deleuzian posthumanism. We might alternatively characterize these efforts as the articulation of Lawrence’s encounter with philosophical modernity, a concept defined by Rosi Braidotti as “the discourse of the crisis of the rational subject”. From this perspective, much of the adverse commentary on Lawrence and philosophy from the earlier critical tradition begins to take on an anachronistic colouring, in the sense of its being oblivious, or at best resistant, to the way in which a dominant conception of philosophy is being reorientated, perhaps dismantled, from Lawrence’s time onwards. Lawrence, that is to say, may be accused of being unphilosophical, but philosophy is no longer where it was thought to be. The obvious starting point for such an account, in Lawrence and more generally, is with Nietzsche. While it is almost routine to invoke Nietzsche as a crucial influence on Lawrence’s early intellectual formation, there remains a gap for the elaboration of a relationship between the two as philosophical writers, which is where Colin Milton’s 1987 study falls short, admirable as it otherwise is in the exercise of constructing a model of Nietzsche’s ‘thought’ and relating Lawrence to that. But Milton does draw attention to an abiding inhosпитability to Nietzsche’s mode of philosophizing in the Anglo-American tradition, to the extent that up to the mid-1980s, in Milton’s own and many other university libraries, Nietzsche was classified under literature rather than philosophy, reflecting “his
banishment, earlier in the century, from the ranks of the speculatively sober and respectable”.7

These observations help to explain why, in this essay, I am not principally interested in following up the question of how Lawrence’s thought might be related to deconstructionist or posthumanist traditions, for example. This work thankfully continues, and demonstrates that Lawrence is being taken seriously as a philosophical thinker, but it occupies a different kind of critical space to the one I wish to sketch out here. My concern is instead, for the time being, with the embrace of philosophy, of the name of philosophy, as theory and as practice – in other words, with the adherence to the idea of philosophy, in the radically altered circumstances of philosophical modernity. In a valedictory tribute to Gilles Deleuze, Rosi Braidotti discusses Deleuze’s insistence on “the empowering force of affirmative passions”, and pauses to confess: “I still find it hard to believe how much Deleuze did love philosophy”.8 As well as asking what might be at stake in unclamping the quotation marks from ‘philosophy’ on Lawrence’s behalf, I also seek to pose the question here: did Lawrence love philosophy?

Some further consideration of the concept of philosophical modernity may be of benefit. Braidotti’s work Patterns of Dissonance (1991) reflects on how far we are accustomed to thinking of philosophical modernity in terms of ‘crisis’, a crisis surrounding concepts of rationality and subjectivity. To this we might add talk of the end or ruin of metaphysics, the decline of system-building (which might of course differ from ‘systematic thought’), and of philosophy as a master discipline, and hence of the ideas of the philosopher-king or queen. The latter, authoritative images are of a person who, in the words of Richard Rorty, knows “something about knowing which nobody else knows so well”.9 Instead, modernity implies a scaling-down of philosophy’s ambition, a humility that, for Jürgen Habermas, ensures it takes on the roles of “stand-in and interpreter” rather than judge or usher.10 Through the linguistic turn, language displaces thought, yet in a
way that undermines logocentrism: meaning displaces truth, pragmatism displaces the search for universals. Or again for Habermas, philosophy assumes the lineaments of modernist aesthetic autonomy, and in so doing commits the fallacy, as Jay Bernstein has it, of mistaking subject-centred reason for reason per se.\footnote{11}

Yet some younger philosopher-academics such as Braidotti or Simon Critchley have begun to express distrust of this narrative of philosophical modernity, or at least of the means of appropriating it. ‘Crisis’, Braidotti asserts, is not the same as ‘void’. In some hands, the crisis narrative can tend to vulgarize or trivialize the practice of contemporary philosophy, through the adoption of a reflex, neo-humanistic nihilism fuelled by accusations of the contemporary threat to the human person, and propagating instead a “generalized nostalgia for humanistic ideals”. By contrast, Braidotti sees contemporary French philosophy not picking through the ruins of metaphysics but demonstrating the will to “engage in philosophical discourse by all possible means”, and to open out the field of philosophy to “other, new extra-philosophical preoccupations”. In the case of Patterns of Dissonance this means setting aside philosophical universalism in order to pose the question of a new mode of relation between women and contemporary philosophy. Yet it also opens out, on Braidotti’s part, into a surprisingly unselfconscious, nostalgic-seeming avowal of faith in the exercise of thought, the power and “aesthetic beauty” of thinking, and philosophy as a “living stock of cumulated knowledges about reason, rationality, and the structure of the thinking subject itself”.\footnote{12} This anticipates Alain Badiou’s more recent declaration that the abiding features of the crisis narrative – that we are at the end of metaphysics, that language is the site of thought – bespeak too strong a commitment to polyvalence and plurality of meaning, and that in doing so they reflect or are too compatible with the world as it is, thus constituting obstacles to the desire of philosophy, which is to establish a certain distance or rupture from the world.\footnote{13}
For Simon Critchley what is at stake is the trivialization of deconstruction from within. Critchley’s impatience with the word ‘deconstruction’ itself is largely due, as he sees it, to the degraded version of it peddled to generations of humanities students, forcing them into “an intellectual cul-de-sac of locating binaries in purportedly canonical texts and cultural epiphenomena and then relentlessly deconstructing them in the name of a vaguely political position somehow deemed to be progressive”.\textsuperscript{14} By comparison, the rigour of Jacques Derrida as a reader of texts lay not in this one-sided version of deconstruction but in what Critchley calls a “double reading”, obliging the reader to patiently construct an initial, faithful interpretation of the text and its authorial contexts before unravelling “the unthought within the thought” of that text. If, following Rodolphe Gasche, the activity of traditional philosophical thinking is the reduction of the other to the same, Derridean reading exists, as Critchley puts it, to “keep open a dimension of alterity which can neither be reduced, comprehended, nor, strictly speaking, even thought by philosophy”.\textsuperscript{15} It may nevertheless be a precise consequence of this goal that, according to a petition presented by twenty academic philosophers when Derrida was finally presented with his honorary doctorate at Cambridge in the 1990s, his work did not “meet accepted standards of rigour and clarity” – an accusation that could easily take us back to the question of Lawrence and philosophy in the early twentieth century, or of a threat to the “soberness and respectability” of the august profession of philosophy.

To pause and summarize: whilst holding a conviction that we can and should unclamp ‘philosophy’ in Lawrence’s case, I have become sceptical about operationalizing this mainly through the assimilation of Lawrence to the ‘crisis’ narrative of philosophical modernity. This is not because such a narrative is irrelevant to Lawrence, but because it is by now a little too ready-made. The question of Lawrence’s inclusion as a philosopher cannot be put to rest with the claim that philosophy had become an unrecognisably fluid discourse in his time; still less can we simply dismiss the
charge of unsystematic thought with the retort that such thought is no longer a requirement of philosophy as such. A phrase involving philosophical babies and Lawrentian bathwater comes to mind here. Tracing similarities or influences between Lawrence and other philosophical thinkers has been one means of reinstating Lawrence with philosophy. On this occasion, however, I return to my earlier question: did Lawrence love philosophy? Did he maintain a commitment to the idea of philosophy itself? In what follows I want to propose as work-in-progress an affirmative answer to these questions, in the sense that there is in Lawrence’s writing a will-to-philosophy, or in Braidotti’s terms a desire to “engage in philosophical discourse by all possible means”, making the practice of philosophy for Lawrence not only highly (or even supremely) valued, but also irresistible.

To begin to make such a case might involve re-reading that moment, towards the end of the period in Cornwall, in April and May 1917, at which Lawrence declared that “Philosophy interests me most now”, “pure abstract thought … a little perfect and detached understanding” (3L 127, 110). We have been encouraged, partly by Lawrence himself, to read this turn against art as a war-weary, surveillance-weary misanthropy, seeking only to transcend the “emotions and squirmings of sensation” in humans, and British humans in particular (3L 110). In the longer durée of his writing, however, I would propose that this declaration cannot appear surprising, nor does it necessarily need the justification of wartime trauma. In other words, it is not a temporary cast of mind or temperamental reflex, but the resurfacing of a preoccupation that can be traced more or less consistently from ‘The Crown’ and the ‘Study of Thomas Hardy’, or even from ‘Art and the Individual’, through to Apocalypse. What is apparent, in the words of the Foreword to Fantasia of the Unconscious, is “the absolute need which one has for some sort of satisfactory mental attitude towards oneself and things in general” which “makes one try to abstract some definite conclusions from one’s experiences as a writer and as a man”. This appears in the context of a strict and familiar ordering
of priority: the so-called “pseudo-philosophy”, Lawrence argues, is “deduced from the novels and poems, not the reverse” (PU 65). Yet we also note the force of that phrase “absolute need” – the absolute need to philosophize? – followed by a twist in the prioritizing which is not so often acknowledged: “And finally, it seems to me that even art is utterly dependent on philosophy: or if you prefer it, on a metaphysic”. It is true that there is a semantic shift here, from abstract noun to noun, philosophy to a philosophy or a more or less unconscious, “gradually developing and gradually withering vision”. However, there is also the suggestion of a dialectical move. In his prominent readings of literature, such as the ‘Study of Thomas Hardy’ or Studies in Classic American Literature, art and metaphysic are so closely bound together for Lawrence that it is difficult to see the gesture of priority towards art as absolute.

While we are re-reading these familiar reference points on philosophy and its relation to art, we must also pause on the clutch of mid-1920s essays on the novel. These essays contain Lawrence’s most sustained references to, or satires on, the status of philosophy as a formal discipline and mode of thought, typified by “that beastly Kant” (STH 154) who, as he writes in the essay ‘Books’, “thought with his head and his spirit”, but never with his blood (RDP 198). Philosophy here is “abstract-dry” and “algebraical”, trying to nail things down with its “fixed ideas” (STH 154); philosophers (a gesture towards Hegel) talk about infinity and the pure spirit which knows all things, “as if they suddenly went off in steam” (STH 194), and because they can think, decide that nothing but thoughts matter. Yet what can also be highlighted is an intense nostalgia surrounding the imagined moment of rupture between philosophy and fiction from Plato and Aristotle onwards. It was “the greatest pity in the world” when philosophy and fiction got split. “Plato’s Dialogues” still managed to remain “queer little novels” (STH 154). Given that Plato remained, for Lawrence, the principal source of a disabling philosophical idealism, it is intriguing to see how the Platonic “discovery” could be differently inflected in the later Reflections on the Death of a Porcupine (1925) – the discovery,
that is, “of how lovely the intellectual idea is” (RDP 309). Although it is only the novel that can give “the full play of all things” and “have the courage to tackle new propositions without using abstractions”, to tackle the ‘what-next’, the essays appeal to the idea that this can only be achieved through fiction and philosophy working together in a new mode (STH 198, 155). The quieter love of philosophy ghosts the noisier rhetoric of the future of the novel.

How, then, might these re-readings feed into a broader reappraisal of what we have continued to call, perhaps for the sake of convenience, Lawrence’s own philosophical writing? In some final, brief speculations or proposals for further work, I want to deploy three provisional categories: system, dialectic, and invention. To begin, I believe that from a certain perspective it would be quite legitimate to see Lawrence’s philosophical writing as too systematic rather than unsystematic. There is a remarkable, some might say monotonous, consistency in the critical orientation of Lawrence’s philosophy: we are losing vitality, and to address this condition of the body, or “man alive”, we need to think seriously about the nature of what it is to think, and the consequences of being condemned to think. Lawrence, that is, in his critiques of idealism and self-consciousness, is extremely preoccupied with the question of what it means to think. This sits squarely with the notion of philosophy as a practice of thinking about thought, even if in Lawrence’s case the paradoxical outcome is to think that too much thinking about thought, or thinking of a certain kind – say, the self-consciousness of the Proustian / Joycean narrative persona – becomes problematic.16

What is equally consistent is the representation of this question in terms of very familiar systems of dualism or antithesis, “two principles”: lion and unicorn (“The Crown”), lion and lamb (“The Reality of Peace”), sympathetic / voluntary (Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious), or, in Reflections on the Death of a Porcupine, existence, which is hierarchically organized, and being, which, as a state of sheer alterity, is not. The latter work, Reflections, in its concrete, post-Shestovian mode, differs markedly from those earlier
and more abstract elaborations, and its particular dualisms may seem less vivid or resonant. Yet it also elides the distance from the earlier works in returning to a characterization of a third, synthetic principle or “thing”: the “Holy Ghost”. By 1925 Lawrence is simultaneously inside and outside of this term, upon which he relied heavily in the earlier philosophy: it sits, he writes, “in the seed of the dandelion”, holding “the light and the dark, the day and the night, the wet and the sunny, united in one little clue”; yet when Jesus called it the Holy Ghost, he “saw it a bit vaguely” (RDP 359, 317). In this distancing aside, Lawrence gestures back to a key moment of philosophical reorientation, from Christian metaphysics to the early Greeks, following his reading of John Burnet’s Early Greek Philosophy in July 1915.

What the “third thing” also signifies is the systematically dialectical turn of Lawrence’s philosophical thinking, even though, in the light of his frequent use of the term ‘philosophy’, it is worth noting that the word “dialectical” does not appear anywhere in Lawrence’s writing (I stand to be corrected), and this despite his working acquaintance with the ideas of Hegel and Marx. Only the American critic Jonathan Arac has had the audacity to note a rigour here, in referring to Lawrence’s demonstration of “an extraordinary, vigorous complexity in his deployment of dialectical terms”, even though the explanation of this – he was “aware of how rapidly a necessary overstatement became a crippling dogma”, and hence “always found the need to unhinge stability and set it into flow again” – points to much more regularly observed features of Lawrence’s thought. The third thing is never in fact a unitary “thing” in Lawrence, not a static synthesis (he is wary of the Greeks’ sense of equilibrium precisely because of this suggestion of stasis) but a condition of sustained contradictory meanings: the thing can never coincide with itself, is always pregnant with its contrary. Dialectic in Lawrence may not have the sense of a remorseless strategy found in Theodor Adorno’s Minima Moralia, for example, but could be said to occur with systematic frequency rather than as an obstacle to systematic thinking. “Logic is far too
coarse to make the subtle distinctions life demands” (*RDP* 357). Dialectically, there are two ways in which we can take this desire for the making of subtle distinctions on Lawrence’s part: on the one hand, as a surprisingly scrupulous analytic principle; and, on the other, as a process of making or a production of the new. Of relevance here may be Jay Bernstein’s description of philosophy as “composition” in Adorno, “ceaseless self-renewal”; “*what happens in it*” is neither a thesis nor a position.19

This brings me to the third category of invention, which I want to pursue in the manner of Deleuze and Guattari’s characterization of philosophy as the invention of concepts. Typically in Deleuze, this definition involves a strenuous repudiation of certain familiar reference points anchoring the concept of philosophy itself. Philosophy is not contemplation or reflection – “no one needs philosophy to reflect on anything” – while the Habermasian notion of communicative rationality is treated witheringly: “the idea of a Western democratic conversation between friends has never produced a single concept”. Bound up in this no doubt is the permeation of the market, of marketing, into the very concept of the concept. Deleuze and Guattari register their dismay at the concept’s commodification through disciplines of communication, and their collusion in “the general movement that replaced Critique with sales promotion”. The result is to propose a philosophical practice which is neither propositional nor transitive – difficult, as Braidotti notes, given that in the tradition of Western metaphysics thinking is always thinking *about* something – yet which at the same time resists the idea that philosophy has no use or utilitarian value (“To say that the greatness of philosophy lies precisely in its not having any use is a frivolous answer that not even young people find amusing any more”).20

I must pause here, however, to note an easy drift in my argument that needs to be resisted. Lawrence’s thought is again being likened to another body of work, that of Deleuze and Guattari, and in a way that entails the dismantling of a conventional idea of philosophy. The notion of the invention of concepts sits well
with Lawrence’s view that only with the help of philosophy would
the novel acquire the “courage” to tackle new propositions whilst
avoiding the pitfalls of abstraction. We are also now well
acquainted with the influence of Lawrence on Deleuze’s commit-
ment to “lines of flight”. Our emphasis should remain, however, on
the fact that when they come in their “old age”, literal or
philosophical, to ask What is Philosophy? (1991), Deleuze and
Guattari’s discussion reconfigures their desire for philosophy, and it
is this desire that is also partly derived from Lawrence.
Furthermore, what is clear in the seeming-technology of the
Deleuzian / Guattarian vocabulary is that philosophy does not
repudiate system, but gives to system a radically new slant; while it
is said today that “systems are bankrupt”, it only means for them
that the concept of system has changed, or can be recreated in a
radically new way.21

“The Greeks, being sane, were pantheists and pluralists, and so
am I”, writes Lawrence in ‘Him With His Tail in His Mouth’ (RDP
313). Philosophy here may be able to hang on to its role as guardian
of rationality, but a pantheistic and pluralistic universe provides
reason or sanity with no roads or goals: having as he puts it “more
or less caught up with” the Platonic perfect idea, which is
Lawrence’s shorthand for progressive Enlightenment modernity,
we find with a dialectical Adornian twist only “a sort of vast, white,
polished tomb-stone”, or the “prison-walls” of scientific ideas –
natural selection, conservation of energy – that become “absolutes”
(RDP 311, 287). We are imprisoned, “unless we realise that we
don’t know what they mean” (RDP 287). Here the philosophical
enterprise is reminiscent of Mary Midgley’s, in Science and Poetry
(2001), in revealing how science enters category trouble, makes the
wrong kind of proposition, when it claims foundational status for its
theories about the physical world. We “won’t know what we mean”
until philosophy helps us to realize the limits of mere knowledge
about the world. It is tempting here to turn to Jean-François
Lyotard’s invocation of an inhuman future which is simultaneously
a terminus for philosophy: “after the sun’s death there won’t be a thought to know that its death took place.”

Nevertheless, “the philosophic problem”, Lawrence writes, is “to find the way ahead” (RDP 311). This is a rational, pragmatic and practical desire, an absolute philosophical need on Lawrence’s part to question absolutes, a need to think clearly and systematically about the dismantling of old ideas of system. My sense is that this will-to-philosophy in Lawrence consistently overcame his scepticism about what it was possible to think, so that as Braidotti puts it of Deleuze, he is one of the few to emerge from the ruins of metaphysics “with a strong counter-proposal”. When philosophy came right for Lawrence, as it seemed to do early in 1916, it could make him feel, as he wrote in a letter to Ottoline Morrell, “satisfied, and as sure as a lark in the sky” (2L 504).

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12 Braidotti, Patterns of Dissonance, 2-5.
13 Alain Badiou, Infinite Thought, tr. Oliver Feltham and Justin Clemens (London: Continuum, 2003).
15 I have previously argued that there is a “distinct shift” in Lawrence’s philosophical writing, registered around the time of the composition of ‘Democracy’ (1919), after his discovery of the Russian philosopher Leo Shestov. See D. H. Lawrence, Science and the Posthuman (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005), 239.
17 Ibid., Recovering Ethical Life, 173.
19 Ibid., 9.