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musical settings of Lawrence's works, composed between 1914 and the present day. I have already found this Appendix invaluable in my own research in this area.

The monograph is densely but accessibly written with well-linked sections and a clear trajectory. It is packed with fascinating material – the only slight caveat being that in rare moments it is possible to lose the argumentative thread due to its sheer breadth and range. The combining of literary and musicological analysis is skilfully handled; where musical examples are provided and discussed, these are not presented in a way that would deter an inexperienced reader. Reid has achieved something really important – and long overdue – in this book. Scholars of Lawrence and modernism alike are now well equipped to situate him as a writer for whom music was an absolute, defining inspiration and a key element within his works.

John Worthen, *Young Frieda*.

London: Jetstone, 2019.

Pp. 192. £10.00 (paperback). ISBN 978 1 9108 5815 8

Reviewed by Neil Roberts

I have met only two men who knew Frieda Lawrence. In both cases she was an old woman at the time and the men were much younger than her. But in both cases I felt that they were in some way in love with her.

John Worthen's new book suggests that he would not be surprised by this. The title does not merely indicate that the book covers Frieda's early years (in fact the narrative takes us up to Lawrence's death and beyond) but that she was, in words that the author attributes to her, "forever young" (91).

Young Frieda is not a biography; but nor, though it is a work of fiction, is it exactly a novel. Worthen states that he had earlier attempted and abandoned a biography of Frieda because of the lack

of evidence about her first marriage to Ernest Weekley. The present book might be described as biography by fictional means.

It takes the form of two fictional memoirs, one by Frieda and one by Weekley. Though the book centres on their marriage, Frieda's memoir is also a repudiation of the account she gave of her relationship with Lawrence in *Not I, But the Wind...*, published four years after his death in 1934. Now, supposedly dictating to an amanuensis at her house in El Prado, near Taos, shortly before her own death, and liberated both by Lawrence's established reputation and by the death of Weekley, she can tell what she sees as the truth. In *Not I* she "did not want to write about Ernst", the father of her children, who was still alive, or about her other affairs, "in case they detracted from the importance of my relationship with Lawrence" (47). Most of *Not I* now seems to her "like romance" (46): her motive in writing it was "'advertising' Lawrence" (42). This is likely to be the response of most readers to that book. One virtue of Worthen's method here is that, while it is clearly his own judgement, by attributing it to Frieda herself he generously credits her with self-knowledge. The same applies to more severe judgements. Frieda confesses that when she and Lawrence were separated in Germany in May 1912, and she was angry with him, she "spitefully" told him she was considering an affair with another man (59). Coming from the judging biographer this would be a damning and inappropriate intervention: in the words of Frieda herself it is her self-awareness that the reader registers.

Her account of her relationship with Lawrence is a sober and to some extent depressing one, but it corresponds with the light that biographers have shed on it over the years. "Love" between them was short-lived: there were "some last shreds" in Cornwall, but it had been "worn down by the hard life we had led" (83). His illness in New Mexico in 1924 came because "he had... lost me" (83). However, though the "memoir" pours cold water on the "romance" of Frieda and Lawrence, it is ultimately a triumphant story because of something that is, at least implicitly, more important than personal love: his need of her for his writing, and her creative

contribution to his greatest works: “between 1913 and 1926 I would find myself the real woman behind character after character in his works of fiction. This is my riches, my glory. My deepest conviction and happiness is that I was part of his work as I was of his life” (77).

This revisionary account of Frieda and Lawrence’s relationship is largely convincing, and probably the main interest of this unusual book for Lawrence’s readers. My only demur is that in “her” determination to contradict the story told in *Not I* “Frieda” fails to convey the feelings that initially drew her to Lawrence, in those weeks before they left together for the continent.

The portrayal of the Frieda-Lawrence relationship is not, however, the most striking achievement of Worthen’s book. As I have said, there is also a fictional memoir by Weekley, and Worthen’s main objective is to understand his marriage to Frieda. This he achieves (only speculatively of course) as much through the contrast in manner and even presentation of the two memoirs, as in their substantive content. Frieda’s is presented as the typescript of her dictation, with deletions and asides, to the amanuensis. This presentation corresponds to the engaging informality of her style: “In 1900, I was pregnant, too; and I was sick for a couple of months. I did so much want Ernst to love me—he was all I had—and I felt that I was probably disgusting to him” (28). She writes without defences, and the style of her narrative validates her claim that “my nature is still fundamentally the same as when I was a child” (86).

Weekley’s memoir, by contrast, is presented as a proof copy, the author described on the title page as “Sometime Professor of French and Head of the Modern Language Department at University College, Nottingham; sometime Scholar of Trinity College, Cambridge”. This is the first hint of the mixture of self-importance, insecurity and resentment that Worthen effectively captures throughout Weekley’s narrative. He despises Nottingham (where, of course, Worthen held a Chair) and believes that the scandal of his divorce blocked him from a Chair at Cambridge. In contrast to

the sample of Frieda's style that I gave earlier, a typical sentence of his memoir is, "I am conscious that such obviously self-pitying narratives as this need to be laced with material appealing to the vulgar imagination, to make them even moderately palatable" (ix).

Any fair-minded reader will approach Weekley's story predisposed to sympathy with a man whose life was as devastatingly shattered as his was, and there are elements of sympathy in Worthen's version. He does justice to the hard work and self-sacrifice of Weekley's early life, and touchingly evokes his genuine entrancement on first meeting Frieda. Weekley appreciates the spontaneity and unaffectedness that make him fall in love with her, but is tragically unable to respond in kind, notably on their wedding night, when he is disconcerted by her playful behaviour. Worthen's Frieda boasts that she was able to make Lawrence "realize what it was like to live fully and spontaneously in every moment" (90). Weekley is unable to benefit as Lawrence did.

The most surprising aspect of Weekley's memoir is that he makes frequent and defiant use of the word "fuck". This gives rise to his one reluctant agreement with the person he sarcastically calls "friend Lawrence", citing his defence of "obscene" language in 'A Propos of *Lady Chatterley's Lover*'. Ironically this is one of Weekley's most damaging self-revelations. His use of the word "fuck" is performative and aggressive, as if compensating for his cuckolding: "two or three times every night and usually in the morning too—I fucked her"; "Frieda was thoroughly fucked"; "What really stuffed my bag, I discovered, was fucking her two or three times, from all angles" (xlv-xlvii). After Frieda has confessed to her earlier affairs he rapes her. Nothing could be further removed from the spirit of 'A Propos of *Lady Chatterley's Lover*': "Sex is the balance of male and female in the universe, the attraction, the repulsion, always different, always new" (LCL 323).

We will probably never know the truth about the Weekley marriage, but for imaginative insight *Young Frieda* is unlikely to be bettered.

Annabel Abbs, *Frieda: A Novel of the Real Lady Chatterley*. London: Two Roads, 2018. Pp 371. £14.99 (hardcover). ISBN 978 1 5293 0018 5

Reviewed by Lee M. Jenkins

Annabel Abbs's *Frieda* belongs to the "author's wife" subgenre of the biographical novel which extends from Robert Graves's *Wife to Mr Milton* (1943) to novels of wives to Messrs. Hemingway and Fitzgerald like Paula McLain's *The Paris Wife* (2012) and Therese Anne Fowler's *Z* (2013). Recuperations of the author's wife inevitably corroborate the cliché that behind every great man there is a great woman, albeit sometimes with a twist. In Meg Wolitzer's novel *The Wife* (2003), for example, as in the 2017 movie adaptation of the same name, the wife of a Nobel Laureate elect is herself the author of her husband's novels, drawing on his life experiences in her writing. More often, however, author's wife fictions replicate the gendered status quo ante they seek to reverse, since in this subset of life-writing the woman is coterminous with life and the man with writing. The eponymous heroine of *Frieda* is wife to D. H. Lawrence, and so Abbs's mission is to restore the original Frieda who survives under Lawrence's pen portraits of her. This proves well-nigh impossible, and as the contradiction-in-terms of its subtitle suggests, Abbs's novel still mediates – and markets – Frieda's life through Lawrence's writing.

Frieda left her own account of her life with Lawrence, of course, and Abbs draws on Frieda's autobiography as well as on Janet Byrne's biography, for instance when "Lorenzo" tells Frieda "You have such a genius for living" (251). In *Not I, But the Wind ...* Frieda also represents herself as an active collaborator in Lawrence's writing, telling us that she "wrote bits of *Sons and Lovers*" (London: Granada, 1983: 50). Abbs's Frieda, who likewise "loved the feeling of collaboration" with Lawrence, has "rewritten great tracts" of *Sons and Lovers* (275). Indeed, when Frieda is briefly reunited with her son, Monty, she goes so far as to tell him

“I wrote a novel”, because “She didn’t want Monty to think of her as a mere muse” (322). Abbs states in her Author’s Note that “This is my story of Frieda as a mother”. But like the biographical Frieda, Abbs’s biofictional Frieda remains caught in the binary of her competing identities as mother and muse.

In chapters alternately titled after and focalised through Frieda, Ernest [Weekley] and two of their three children, Monty and Barby, Abbs’s story takes us from the dissolution of Frieda’s first marriage through her early years with Lawrence to an epilogue set in 1927, when Lawrence is writing the “new novel” that will also be his last, *Lady Chatterley’s Lover* (349). In Abbs’s account it is not Lawrence but Frieda’s sister Johanna (Nusch) who, with her titillating tales of Munich – “a hot bed of free love” – seduces Frieda away from her “boring” life in Nottingham with Weekley, an etymologist and “dry old stick” (6, 10). Munich – where Frieda embarks on an affair with her other sister’s, Else Jaffe’s, former lover, the psychoanalyst Otto Gross – is the scene of Frieda’s sexual and intellectual awakening, and in the scenes set there Abbs’s novel, too, comes alive, feeding as it does on such rich source material as Martin Green’s fine study, *The von Richthofen Sisters*.

Back in Nottingham, Frieda encounters Lawrence, tells him about Freud, and cures what she has diagnosed as his Oedipus complex when she invites him “to come and lie with her in the woods” (156). There, in the hotbed of love that is Sherwood Forest, Lawrence threads violets through the pubic hair of the “real” Lady Chatterley, who, like her fictional surrogate, “feel[s] herself coming back to life” (172). However, after years of living with an almost wholly unsympathetic Lawrence, Abbs’s Frieda comes to feel that “With Otto she had reclaimed herself. But only to forfeit it as Mrs Lawrence, as a multitude of fictional characters, palimpsests of herself, dredged from Lorenzo’s imagination” (354).

Author’s wife fictions effect no more than a temporary separation of wife from author insofar as the wife is recovered from one author only to become the property of another. Far from

resurrecting the original Frieda, Abbs adds another layer to the “palimpsest” of Frieda’s fictional proxies: Abbs critiques Lawrence for making the living Frieda into a paper doll but also reinscribes her “real” Frieda in the terms of his fiction. Arguably, Abbs’s novel bites the biofictional hand that feeds it, and does so in highly readable prose that is also, in places, a pastiche of Lawrence’s: “His gaze – straight, guileless, blue – seemed to bore into her and she had ... that strangely thrilling sensation of being split open, like a fig” (201).

In another recent Frieda biofiction, *The Novelist’s Wife* (2015) by Sasha Bristol (Marianna Torgovnick), Frieda says that Lawrence is “linking our life to his work” (Northampton MA: The Modernist Press, 2015: n. p. Kindle edition). Annabel Abbs’s Frieda may want to decouple her life from his art, but *Frieda: A Novel of the Real Lady Chatterley* shows us that we cannot recoup Frieda’s “story” from Lawrence’s fiction.

Indrek Männiste, ed., *D. H. Lawrence, Technology, and Modernity*.

London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019.

Pp xxii + 234. £96 (hardcover). ISBN 978 1 5013 4000 0

Reviewed by David Trotter

There is wall-to-wall D. H. Lawrence in this welcome collection of fifteen essays on a relatively unexamined topic, and a lot of modernity, but not quite as much technology as one might perhaps have expected.

Technology, as the philosopher John Durham Peters has put it, is the externalisation of technique into durable form (*The Marvelous Clouds: Towards a Philosophy of Elemental Media* [Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2015], 91). As such, it is as old as the wheel, if not older. In literary studies, however, it has not yet shaken off its long association with aspects of “modernity”: a loose,

baggy monster of a term so dulled by over-use that it is hard to know any longer exactly what it refers to. Lawrence remains central to that association; and, given his increasingly bitter campaign against industrial capitalism, for very good reason. F. R. Leavis notoriously championed him as a staunch opponent of “technologico-Benthamite” civilisation (*English Literature in Our Time and the University* [Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1969], 125). Raymond Williams, establishing him as heir to the Carlylean critique of the social, political and cultural effects of runaway industrialisation, provided some historical context (*Culture and Society: Coleridge to Orwell* [London: The Hogarth Press, 1990], 200). In the 1990s, Michael Bell introduced Martin Heidegger’s understanding of technology as a modern metaphysic into his account of Lawrence’s philosophy of being (*D. H. Lawrence: Language and Being* [Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1992], 8). More recently, eco-criticism has productively harnessed Lawrence’s rage against the machine. “It could even be said”, Indrek Männiste remarks in his Introduction to this volume, “that Lawrence’s whole oeuvre arises from an outcry against industrial modernity” (1). We value Lawrence as a witness to the Anthropocene: a term which, although still lacking an agreed definition, may yet prove more reliable than “modernity”.

The largest group of essays in the collection chronicle Lawrence’s long, arduously fruitful maladjustment to a technological age by means of a discussion of the major novels from *The White Peacock* to *Lady Chatterley’s Lover*. Appropriately enough, it is the editor who in his own contribution states most clearly the assumption underlying them. In Lawrence’s writing, Männiste proposes, technology should be understood as “almost always synecdochal and representing industrial modernity in its entirety” (176). I found little to disagree with in any of these essays, while at the same time feeling that there is much to be gained, as Tina Ferris, Annalise Grice, Andrew Harrison and Katherine Toy Miller demonstrate in exemplary fashion, by a narrower focus on a specific historical event or context.

Technology, the externalisation of technique into durable form, remains the dog that didn't bark in the night. Or if it does bark, the effect is to introduce an odd turbulence into otherwise persuasive and engaging contributions. Fiona Becket, for example, writes with characteristic insight and elegance about key poems in *Birds, Beasts and Flowers* which, as she remarks, put the "sap" back into "sapience" (154). I am not sure, however, that she needed to shoe-horn green technology into her analysis of 'Bare Almond Trees', written in January 1921, in Taormina, in Sicily. "Do you take the whisper of sulphur from the air?" is one of several questions Lawrence asks of the almond trees which winter has transformed into a "strange magnetic apparatus" (*IPoems* 253). Becket suggests that by taking the sulphur from the air, the trees might prove "ecologically helpful", a technologically-enhanced nature thus undoing the damage done by industrial intervention (156). But the chemical in question is surely the sulphur dioxide (SO₂) emitted by volcanoes such as the nearby Mount Etna, which can cause air pollution and acid rain downwind, but is scarcely man-made.

Similarly, I learnt a great deal from Jeff Wallace's deft outline of a Lawrentian "art of living" which the fiction consistently renders by encouraging its protagonists to act on the spur of the moment, for reasons they cannot explain to themselves. Such impetuosity amounts, paradoxically, to a practice; a habit, even. But I could not really see the benefit of introducing the concept of "technologies of the self", which has immediately to be prised out of the grasp of Michel Foucault, for whom it was an ancient art, with the help of commentaries by Gilbert Simondon, Gilles Deleuze and Brian Massumi. In historical terms, the more productive comparison might have been with Marcel Mauss's 1934 lecture on 'Techniques of the Body' (trans. Ben Brewster, *Economy and Society*, 2.1 [1973], 70–88).

Männiste and his contributors have shown that technology does indeed provide a revealing window into many aspects of Lawrence's achievement as a writer. In the end, however, I put the book down wanting to hear more about actual technologies, in the

novels, stories, and poems. Take Anna Brangwen's sewing machine, for example, in *The Rainbow*. Anna Lensky marries Will Brangwen in December 1882. After a delirious honeymoon, they fight and make up repeatedly as they search for equilibrium. Since the first electrically-powered machines did not come onto the market until the late 1880s, Anna's would have been hand-cranked, or driven by a treadle. Crank or drive it she certainly does, making it start and stutter and buzz in a gesture of defiance, at once bodily and technological, to which Will has no answer (R 152). The sewing machine matters intensely to Anna. It is her weapon of choice. A synecdoche for industrial modernity? I don't think so.

Carrie Rohman, *Choreographies of the Living: Bioaesthetics in Literature, Art, and Performance*.

New York: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Pp xv + 178. £23.99 (paperback). ISBN: 9780190604417

Reviewed by Jeff Wallace

The critical wager upon which this intriguing and intensely argued book is founded is, in the words of its author, that the "aesthetic impulse itself" (2) is profoundly animal, inhuman and, as such, trans-species. Art should no longer be considered as an exclusively human activity; rather, the affective and somatic dimensions of artistic creation are one of the key ways in which our kinship with inhuman nature is expressed. While we have known since Baumgarten that aesthetics is, as Terry Eagleton puts it (in *The Ideology of the Aesthetic* [Oxford: Blackwell, 1990]), a discourse of the body and the senses, bioaesthetics calls for a more radical rethinking of the physicality or materiality of human art.

Does this therefore, in turn, imply that animals create art? Only, it is argued, in an expanded sense of "excess", play or performance, often associated with sexual selection in animals, which challenges the proposition of post-Darwinian logic that any trait or behaviour has evolved for its functional or "fitness" value alone. In this,

Choreographies of the Living joins a growing body of critical thought re-examining the vitalistic philosophical legacy of Henri Bergson; its specific theoretical co-ordinates are the philosophy of “becoming” of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, and the work of Australian feminist biophilosopher Elizabeth Grosz, who more than anyone has opened up the writing of Charles Darwin to the field of bioaesthetic interpretation.

This book is a development of Carrie Rohman’s work in two main senses. It builds philosophically on her highly significant *Stalking the Subject: Modernism and the Animal* (New York: Columbia UP, 2009), which opened up new avenues of study on D. H. Lawrence from the perspective of animal studies. More surprisingly, however, it connects with Rohman’s own pre-scholarly career in contemporary dance and choreography. Rohman shares these biographical perspectives with her reader from the outset, and thus sets up an affectingly personal framework for the understanding of an intellectual trajectory.

Clearly, dance, with reference to key modernist concepts such as movement, form and “vibration”, is the main route to Rohman’s heightened awareness of the bioaesthetic, and produces three chapters, on Isadora Duncan’s “creatural aesthetic”, the hybrid forms (dance, narrative) of Rachel Rosenthal’s imagined rat “Tatti Wattles”, and Merce Cunningham’s (in partial collaboration with John Cage) de-psychologising animalistic choreography of the “horde” beyond individualism. Into this distinctive context are inserted chapters on Virginia Woolf, and on Lawrence. The “floating monkeys” of Woolf’s little-known children’s story about ‘Nurse Lugton’ gravitate into an assessment of creatureliness in the characters of *The Waves* (a novel originally provisionally entitled *The Moths*). Chapter 2, on ‘Creative Incantations and Involutions in D. H. Lawrence’, gives us new perspectives on the poem ‘Tortoise Shout’ and on *Women in Love*.

What is distinctive about Rohman’s readings of animality in these Lawrence texts is their determination to push beyond the critical protocols of metaphor, symbolism and even of an

“expressionist” aesthetic. Instead, Rohman posits an ontological relation between human and animal that is closely aligned with the Deleuzian notion of becoming. In ‘Tortoise Shout’, attention is first drawn to the “cry” and “scream” which simultaneously evoke human remoteness from and proximity to the creature. This direct appeal to the “body’s sensorium” (44) connects to the general impact of poetry itself, defined by Jorie Graham as primarily “somatic” rather than “cognitive” (42). Rohman therefore turns our attention to the “vibratory” rhythmic qualities of the poem, embodied in a restless process of renaming and rephrasing which calls to mind a “Deleuzian refrain”. A principle of shared vocalisation between the tortoise and the human/poem culminates in the poem’s final cosmic gesture of “the living in general” (51), the time-travelling cry of the tortoise that resonates through the universe.

Turning to *Women in Love*, Rohman first notes the relative critical neglect of dancing as a figure in Lawrence’s work. What she adds to extant accounts is, again, a Deleuzian/Groszian emphasis that sees dance as a mode of artistic expression/excess denoting the possibility of new relationalities or becomings. Of the first of two key dance scenes, Rohman reminds us of Birkin’s subversion of Hermione Roddice’s staging of a Ballets Russes-style event at Breadalby. This is Birkin as Deleuzian “schizo”, his movements generally acknowledged as inhuman in a way that makes Nijinskian modernism appear already conventional.

Thence, of course, Rohman turns fuller attention to the ‘Water-Party’ chapter and to Gudrun’s dancing in the presence of the Highland cattle. Again, the available framing contexts of modernism – Dalcroze, Isadora Duncan – are seen as somehow inadequate to the radical and unsettling nature of Gudrun’s rhythmical movements to the accompaniment of Ursula’s singing. Through Rohman’s own reading of Duncan, the “weightiness” of Gudrun’s dance transmits “the sense of a Deleuzian transmission of earthly forces to human shudderings” (54–5). As befits the challenging concept of becoming-animal, Gudrun’s movements

have nothing to do with imitating or expressing a oneness with the cattle, but with something far less Oedipalised and humanly domesticated. If the cattle are to her, in Lawrence's word, "charming", the charm is located in an electrically-charged quality that invites Gudrun into a "mating" dance which is less sexual than artistic or "becoming-artistic" (57), and which, as such, figures an experimental approach to living and being with the potential to take us beyond ourselves. In the same way, Rohman is able at the end of the chapter to coyly sidestep the "bestial" implications of Ursula and Birkin's later sexual encounter by presenting it as a continuation of the dance of becoming and an "opening into immanence" (62) in which Lawrence has his characters engage.

Rohman's stimulating and sometimes dazzling new reading of animality in Lawrence goes some way towards suggesting that this book's opening critical wager is a successful one. What kinds of significance, or politics, the concept of the bioaesthetic allows us to dance towards, may remain a more open question. The often-impassioned pitch and register of the writing suggest that the stakes are high, and a certain energetic endorsement of Deleuzian principles asks to be taken for granted. The reader might have wished for a more grounded explanation of the difficult concept of becoming, especially when in the chapter on Lawrence a dizzying dance is sometimes performed with and around the variants on modes of becoming on offer: "becoming-intense, becoming-other, and becoming-artistic" (57), becoming-imperceptible, Gudrun's becoming-cow and Birkin's becoming-plant, all alongside the becoming-animal.

In Deleuze's own texts there is a certain tension between the affirmative rhetorical quality of becoming and the very careful analytical resistance to humanist recuperation that the concept represents, and which often seems to proceed by negation: that is, we neither imitate nor become the animal in question, nor is becoming another version of the ideas that the self either evolves or is subject to the unpredictability of constant flux. The notion of becoming as a zone of indiscernible relatedness between a human

and an other, a “block of becoming”, assumes that each is already a multiplicity, always-already generating the kinds of novelty that literature can help us to imagine and that humanism suppresses. This does not necessarily translate easily into the binary prioritising of affective over conceptual, or somatic over cognitive, that Rohman sees in the aesthetic and that she enthusiastically associates with the Lawrentian idea of art as the symbolic language of blood-consciousness.

Rohman is, at the same time, surprised that Deleuze and Guattari choose to value Lawrence’s literature of becoming on the grounds of individual genius rather than as the expression of a modernist “block” preoccupied with “humanism’s crisis vis-à-vis the animal” (58–9). Yet *Choreographies of the Living* cannot itself help but enhance our understanding of Lawrence’s unique contribution to this crisis, to literature and to philosophical thought beyond the human.

Stewart Smith, *Nietzsche and Modernism: Nihilism and Suffering in Lawrence, Kafka and Beckett*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. Pp 250. £79 (hardcover). ISBN 978 3 3197 5534 2

Reviewed by Greg Garrard

The problem of nihilism, or the debilitating meaninglessness of suffering, is at the heart of Friedrich Nietzsche’s work, according to this monograph in Palgrave’s Studies in Modern European Literature. The Christian ascetic ideal reassured believers that suffering had meaning within a providential schema, albeit at the cost of negating the human body and the Earth. Ironic offshoots of the aesthetic ideal such as scepticism and Darwinism demolished that assurance, leaving “we moderns” adrift in angst and anomie. The solution, according to Smith’s reading of Nietzsche, is to conjure an aesthetically pleasing shape and meaning *ex nihilo* in a high-wire act of self-creation above an abyss.

As a philosophy student, I admired and feared this existentialist Nietzsche: he spoke to my faithlessness and underwrote my self-fashioning, though I was unnerved even then by his blithe surmounting of good and evil and apparent endorsement of an aesthetic (if no more) of cruelty. Smith would reassure that self with the observation that Nietzsche's self-overcoming speaks not of indifference but of "vulnerability, or fear of collapse" (26). Adopting this sensitive existentialist Nietzsche as an "heuristic" or interpretive framework, Smith sees each of his literary examples as exploring the problem of nihilism in a specific context. Accordingly, Smith writes of *Lady Chatterley's Lover*: "As the novel focuses upon personal and collective experiences of paralysis and exhaustion, I shall stress that its depictions of erotic regeneration and power relations seek to address this nihilistic condition, to engender new hope and meaning" (70). Franz Kafka's *The Trial* dramatises Josef K's futile efforts to give meaning to his apparently "useless, unredeemable suffering" (156) through interpretative activity, and Samuel Beckett's *Endgame* portrays characters in protracted physical pain who can neither find meaning in it nor cease the search altogether.

Taking Nietzsche's preoccupation with nihilism as an "heuristic" allows Smith to follow the thread of the nihilism argument through his chosen literary texts in a largely compelling and illuminating fashion. This approach takes too little account, though, of the different biographical and historical relationship of Nietzsche's work to each of the authors. Lawrence's initial response to Nietzsche was shaped by his reading of the Oscar Levy translations from the Croydon library and the various interpretations published in A. R. Orage's *The New Age*. Later, during the middle period of the Great War and immediately afterward, Lawrence was frequently reported as arguing about Nietzsche with Frieda, who had been persuaded by the psychoanalyst Otto Gross that she was a Nietzschean *überfrau* who needn't concern herself with bourgeois morality. Over and above the evidence of direct "influence" by texts and ideas, then, there is a

Nietzschean theme within Lawrence's own tumultuous marriage. To use a Nietzschean "heuristic" to interpret a literary work that may, to some unknowable degree, be *intended* to address problems the philosopher posed suggests a kind of circularity Smith seems unwilling to consider. In his sparse explicit statements on Nietzsche Lawrence depicts himself as challenging or testing the philosopher's ideas, so it seems rebarbative to suggest he is essentially illustrating them. Nietzsche himself considered that life could only be justified as an aesthetic phenomenon, so why not pursue that conviction with real courage? Literature is too often the handmaiden of philosophy and theory.

Smith's book is a converted thesis, which accounts for its patient exposition and extraordinary breadth of reference. The scope of the research is impressive – each chapter could almost function as a summary of critical perspectives on the author discussed – but it creates the impression of painstaking triangulation from existing perspectives rather than a fully original statement. The prose, too, remains thesis-like, with a lot of "I argue ..." and "x notes ...". Early career authors really ought to be coached towards livelier and more confident prose for their first monograph.

Smith's analysis of a Nietzschean concern with nihilism speaks to our historicised understanding of how modernism was, precisely, an urgent anguished response to what was then modernity. But, philosophy undergraduates aside, are we still assailed by the futility of existence? The question seems at once too cosmic and too parochial. The unfolding of secularisation in societies that have never been Christian might allow us to test whether nihilism is a uniquely post-Christian phenomenon. At the same time, consumer societies minister assiduously to the appetites of at least some human bodies, but are unable, as Zarathustra put it, to be "true to the earth". In light of contemporary environmental concerns – which Lawrence anticipated in some respects – Smith's assumption of the centrality of human, all-too-human, suffering ends up making Nietzsche and modernism seem *more* dated than they need to be.

**Kumiko Hoshi, *D. H. Lawrence and Pre-Einsteinian Relativity*.
Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2018.
Pp xi + 167. £58.99 (hardcover). ISBN 978 1 5275 1618 2.**

Reviewed by Jeff Wallace

What is “lost” about Alvina Houghton in *The Lost Girl*? Kumiko Hoshi suggests that the word’s polysemy is figured in three different translations of the novel’s title into Japanese: one, by Tetsuhiko Uemura, that is literal; another, by Akiko Yamada, that means “Alvina’s Degeneration”; and another, in a collection of essays edited by the Kyoto Study Circle of D. H. Lawrence, that means “The Fallen Woman”. In her reading of the novel itself, Hoshi traces even more subtle changes in the word’s meaning. When applied, archly by Miss Pinnergar, to Alvina’s cardplaying with men, it means ruined or at least morally questionable. It also describes how in her trajectory Alvina becomes *déclassé* within the middle class, while when she moves to the Italian mountains with Ciccio, Alvina is geographically and culturally displaced, or lost to the world as it were. Yet finally, this being-lost then becomes the necessary basis of a potential for radically-transformative and affirmative self-fulfilment.

The subtle instabilities of “lost” are of a piece, Hoshi persuasively argues, with a concept of relativity at work in Lawrence’s presentation of human identity: Alvina achieves “a new kind of self” that will “keep changing as long as she has bodily relationships with other humans and the world surrounding her” (74). The substance of this lively and interesting book is that, before Lawrence first read Einstein in 1921, his writing was already strongly imbued with a sense of the relative and of the relational.

In this, Hoshi’s book inevitably invites comparison with Rachel Crossland’s *Modernist Physics: Waves, Particles and Relativities in the Writings of Virginia Woolf and D. H. Lawrence*, also published in 2018 (reviewed in *JDHLS* 5.1 [2018], 213–7). Crossland pays detailed attention to Einstein’s writings, and thus compels the

reader to think more strenuously about the relation of Lawrence's thinking to wave-particle dualism or to the co-existence of relativity with the absolute of light's velocity. Hoshi is less concerned than Crossland about what A. S. Eddington identified in *The Nature of the Physical World* (1928) as the common mistake of conflating a precise scientific theory of relativity with forms of philosophical relativism, despite pointing out that Lawrence himself might be guilty of the same in having Lovatt Somers declare in *Kangaroo* the post-Einsteinian cliché that "Everything is relative" (125).

However, Hoshi takes her cue from Lawrence's observation to S. S. Kotliansky, after allegedly reading the 'Special and General Theory of Relativity', that Einstein wasn't so "metaphysically marvellous", interpreting this as an indication that Lawrence was already strongly aware of a "metaphysics" of relativity. Her book demonstrates that it is still a legitimate strategy to refer to a rich and anticipatory pre-Einsteinian context of relativity informing Lawrence's work before 1921, and that the benefits of exploring the relationship between various relativisms and Einsteinian relativity are likely to outweigh the dangers of loose analogy.

While it is certainly not new in itself to highlight a context of relativisms from which Lawrence drew, Hoshi's approach is refreshing due to the subtlety of her close reading, the choice of primary material and, in particular, the alert yet often surprising illustrative conjunctions drawing together materialist philosophy and the modernist visual arts. For example, in *Women in Love*, Hoshi sees the novel's dialectic between light and dark as an expression of discourses on "ether" as a medium of mutual relationship, giving rise to comparisons of Ernst Haeckel's "relative monism" both with the technique of *chiaroscuro* in Rembrandt and the exploration of centripetal and centrifugal force in the sculpture of Italian Futurist Umberto Boccioni.

A similarly enterprising connection is made between the principle of constant, restless movement in *Aaron's Rod* and the representation of four-dimensional space in modernist painting, notably Marcel Duchamp's *Nude Descending a Staircase, No. 2*

(1912). Hoshi rightly notes that changes in the thinking of time-space co-ordinates necessarily implied a reassessment of assumptions about the nature of vision; hence, Aaron Sisson's mode of seeing things can be brought into relation with the simultaneous multiple perspectives of Paul Cézanne's still-life painting. Glimpsing the development of relativity in Lawrence's fiction post-Einstein, a very fertile analogy is again proposed between the principle of collage in the writing of *Kangaroo* and the photomontage technique of Hannah Hoch's *Cut With The Dada Kitchen Knife* (1919).

Elsewhere, Hoshi is able to reimagine the familiar historical thematics or preoccupations of Lawrence's fictions within new contexts of relativity. The treatment of the New Woman in *The Lost Girl* is seen as subtly relativised by techniques of Bakhtinian parody, while an important critical comparison of the two very different versions of *The Fox* allows Hoshi to take a detour around familiar sexual-political approaches to this abidingly "strange" novella, emphasising instead a relativistic androgyny applicable not only to Jill March but also to the predatory hunter figure of Henry Grenfell.

Given the boldness of this book's deployment of visual modernism in particular, it is a great shame that the publisher was not able to improve upon the very poor reproduction quality of some of the images used. Nevertheless, this is not sufficient to detract significantly from the clarity of Hoshi's writing and the originality of her argument. *D. H. Lawrence and Pre-Einsteinian Relativity* makes a valuable contribution to our developing understanding of the role of relativity in the Lawrentian thought-adventure, and at a time in world history when, it seems, we need a theory of "human relativity" and of mutual relationality more than ever before.

Barry J. Scherr, *Shakespeare's Hamlet and Lawrence Agonistes: The Early Phase.*

Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2018.

Pp. 366. £49.95 (hardcover). ISBN 978 1 5275 1113 2

Reviewed by Elise Brault-Dreux

In his enthusiastic book, Barry J. Scherr highlights the meaningful presence of “Shakespeare-Hamlet” in Lawrence’s oeuvre. Scherr proposes a close reading of letters written by the young Lawrence, then focuses extensively on *Women Love*, and concludes with *Aaron’s Rod* and *Kangaroo*. Throughout, Scherr repeatedly stands against the “extreme left-wing” (“feminist”, “atheist” or “Foucauldian”) Lawrentian critiques and deconstructs their analysis, by reading Lawrence’s individualism, anti-intellectualism and defence of the flesh and blood through the lens of Lawrence’s personal interpretation of *Hamlet* – Hamlet as selfish, conceited and anti-sensual.

In Chapter One, Scherr proposes that Lawrence’s quarrel with Shakespeare (first voiced in *Twilight in Italy* [TI 76]) is, as often with Lawrence, based on a uniquely personal reading, his “creative misreading of Hamlet” (132), and through which he ends up exposing his own philosophy. Drawing an obvious link between Lawrence’s attendance at a performance of *Hamlet* in Italy in 1913 and his famous letter about his “Great Religion of the blood” (2L 470–1), Scherr then starts his demonstration of Lawrence’s anti-cerebral stance as a reaction to “Shakespeare-Hamlet”. While Lawrence passionately defends the supreme male, the ideal Self, the highest conception of the I – which for Scherr is a “Jewish” vision of the glorious bodily self – Shakespeare kills it in murdering Hamlet’s father in a “Christian” valorisation of the dying, “crucified” body and self.

Scherr goes on in Chapter Two to introduce Hamlet as a feckless character, unable to prevent Claudius from killing his father, incapable of love, and clearly anti-erotic – a complex feeling of

frustration that leads to his world-famous soliloquy. Scherr does propose a stimulating parallel between Hamlet and Hermione in *Women in Love*, based on Lawrence's insect metaphors: while in *Twilight in Italy* Hamlet is a black beetle that must be squashed (*TI* 77), Hermione's skull must be "cracked like an insect" (*WL* 42), and he suggests this equation clearly sets both characters as "sterile-cerebral" egoists who sharply contrast with Lawrence's "passional-creative" consciousness. But, relying on Bloomian theory, Scherr indicates that Lawrence-Birkin tries to redeem, complete and enlarge Hamlet's famous soliloquy, and thus to rescue the Self and strengthen its psychic-ontology. Here, Scherr again warns his reader against too-hasty left-wing interpreters and defenders of equality: the Lawrentian Self is posited as unique, inherently unequal with other selves.

Another keystone analysis in this chapter is Scherr's treatment of the issue of death and rebirth. While Hamlet's sleep of death is negative (Act 3), Lawrence-Birkin's is more "life affirming" and leads to re-birth – a fundamental gap that Scherr relates to Birkin's being psychic-ontologically strong enough to deal with women in love, as opposed to the inexperienced Hamlet who is incapable of love. While Scherr sees that both Birkin and Hamlet share a desire to set the world right, he considers only the "Jewish" patriarchal Birkin is ready to confront "Pagan" Ursula, and that Birkin's "psychic-ontological strength" (a phrase which is omnipresent in the book) derives from his intense desire to turn his own self into something wonderful and makes him – unlike Hamlet – capable of mature love.

In Chapter Three, Scherr shows how Lawrence fashions a "'Jewish' world of leaders/heroes" who are supposed to stand out against the failure of the "Christian"/ "matriarchal" Shakespeare-Hamlet. He then elaborates a convincing portrait of Gerald as a Lawrentian Christian figure of self-sacrifice who has abandoned his sacred self to the woman, Gudrun. This leads Scherr to portray Gerald as a "Christian" Hamlet who destroys himself and Western civilisation as he takes revenge. But like Hamlet, as a tragic hero,

he is unable to complete his revenge, “death swallows him”. Scherr concludes with a debate around the recurrently drawn links between Gerald and Cain.

In Chapter Five Scherr synthesises Lawrence’s philosophy as “Lawrence’s great (anti-Shakespearean) embrace of ‘[self-] fulfilment,’ Lawrence’s great (anti-Shakespearean) attack on ‘[self-] suppression and [self-] abnegation,’ and Lawrence’s great (anti-Shakespearean) valorisation of the ‘immediate intimate self’” (217). Scherr proposes that the “Jewish”/ “pre-Christian”, “anti-social” Lawrence who wants, with *Women in Love*, to liberate Western civilisation, contrasts sharply with Lawrence’s idea of a “Christian-democratic” Shakespeare who, for Lawrence, is the cause of England’s “desecration” (233). Civilisation can be rescued only by “religious ‘priests of life’ and individuality” (295), in touch with spontaneous existence, unlike Claudius for instance, who, according to Lawrence, is deprived of such powerful individuality.

Scherr starts his last Chapter with Lawrence’s essay ‘Blessed are the Powerful’ where Lawrence declares that power “comes from beyond” (*RDP* 321). Scherr then shows that Birkin draws his power from “behind” (as shown with Ursula in “Excuse”), as “one of the Sons of God” – unlike Hamlet whose power derives from his conceited will (324).

Scherr focuses throughout on the contest for supremacy between Lawrence and Shakespeare, and, by the end of his book, seems to be asserting that after *Women in Love* Lawrence somehow makes himself superior in a “Lawrentian realm, that of psychic-ontological strength” (340) and that “the heroic/Judaic/Davidic/Lawrentian Man with his ‘deep power-urge’” (347) has rescued Civilisation from Christian-Shakespearean self-hatred and ideals.

Scherr’s book proposes micro-analyses of Lawrence’s texts which, though often read, here reveal themselves in a new light. In clear opposition (sometimes rather excessive or extreme) to the trend of Lawrentian critiques, Scherr makes his own voice heard, and Lawrence and Hamlet are brought together in a quite original way.

**Robert Spoo, *Modernism and the Law*.
London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018.
Pp. 196. £21.99 (paperback). ISBN 978 1 4742 7580 4**

Reviewed by Andrew Cooper

Books about the interaction between the law and literature tend to focus on the role of the one in suppressing the other, frequently on grounds of obscenity or political dissidence. In the particular case of D. H. Lawrence, the law was used in his lifetime by a number of authorities in a direct assault on what was perceived by many to be his dangerously transgressive writing; while in more recent decades we have become familiar with somewhat trite accounts of the “Lady Chatterley trial” as a vehicle for providing a satirical commentary on antediluvian establishment social mores in the early 1960s, which still sought to protect wives and servants from offence.

In general, more traditional approaches to the subject of literature and the law have posited writers and publishers as primarily the “victims” of the inappropriate intrusion of legal tools into the freedom of their expression. Robert Spoo’s short but extremely detailed book paints a much more complex picture, highlighting a wide-ranging and multi-faceted relationship between writers and the law in the specific context of modernism.

In his Introduction, Spoo promises that his book “offers a concise account of law as it shaped transatlantic literary modernism” (3) and identifies two main parallel approaches to the project. “First and foremost”, he says, the book “examine[s] the ways in which law regulated modern literature, or, more precisely, how legal and extra-legal mechanisms – statutes, courts, prosecutors, purity groups – intervened in ... the communications circuit” (3). Secondly, it provides an

analytical approach that examines the ways in which literary texts register and represent the forces of law. This approach

focuses on the mutually constitutive relationship between law and literature, the ability of creative texts to respond to their jailers, as it were, by reimagining the effects and affects of regulation. (4)

What Spoo treats as “modernism” in this context is book-ended by the careers of Oscar Wilde and Ezra Pound, whose uses of – as well as abuse by – the law are detailed in the opening and closing chapters. Spoo demonstrates in great detail how both writers, and others in between such as Joyce, actively employed legal devices against others in pursuit of their own literary and financial interests.

In the opening chapter – pointedly entitled ‘Oscar Wilde, Man of Law’ (contrasted with the final chapter, ‘Ezra Pound, Man of War’) – Spoo shows convincingly that Wilde took a pro-active and often skilful approach to the law, even if not always (as in his most notorious scrape with the law, his libel action against the Marquess of Queensbury) to his own benefit.

There follows a lengthy and detailed analysis of the ongoing struggle in the modernist era between what was perceived at the time as “obscenity” and the mechanisms of censorship employed to control it – with some emphasis on the mistreatment of *The Rainbow* and *Women in Love* – but he also discusses more disparate relationships between legal concepts in a highly illuminating way. For instance, in his Introduction Spoo notes that “Sometimes, only obscenity laws stood in the way of lawful piracy. The functional antagonisms and surprising affinities between copyright and obscenity laws are recurrent themes in the chapters that follow” (4).

Copyright was a particularly complex issue, especially in the transatlantic marketplace which modernist European-based writers were increasingly keen to penetrate. While the Copyright Act 1911 offered authors in Britain protection during their lifetime and for 50 years after death, there was no equivalent statutory protection in the USA until much later. To achieve protection in the USA authors had to jump through numerous hoops including, for many years, the requirement for a book to have been manufactured in the country.

This led to authors fighting rear-guard actions against perfectly “lawful”, often mass-circulation, pirated editions of their works in the US market.

Some authors utilised private patronage and the issuing of small, exclusive and high value releases of their books in Europe as ways of achieving revenues which they might have struggled to secure by more conventional means. But this could still leave them exposed to much bigger print-runs being lawfully issued in the USA by pirate publishers, such as Samuel Roth’s serialised, expurgated version of Joyce’s *Ulysses*: the novel had been published in Paris by Joyce’s patron Sylvia Beach, who had not secured US copyright protection. Copyright law in the USA also required authors to be able to satisfy questionable “morality” tests, so controversial novels like *Ulysses* and *Lady Chatterley’s Lover* were particularly vulnerable to pirating – on some occasions even in unexpurgated versions – because their authors or original publishers would have struggled to convince the US courts of their right to protect such “immoral” texts. The practice of trade courtesy, whereby publishers in different jurisdictions permitted each other to publish works, was developed partly as a “privatised” attempt by “good” publishers to distinguish themselves – in the absence of clear-cut copyright protection – from the “pirates”. The book also analyses other areas of law, such as defamation, blackmail and privacy, which are discussed in clear and informative detail.

While he acknowledges that comparable legal issues affected writers in both earlier and later periods, Spoo makes a strong case for the modernist era being a particularly fertile time in the development of the tricky interaction between law and literature. The broadening – even breakdown – of social attitudes to moral issues which had previously been much more hazardous to write about, coupled with some writers’ increased willingness to address those issues, gave rise to a much more complex landscape in which the law was called into play – by writers and publishers seeking to protect the value and integrity of their output and by others seeking to suppress or exploit it – to an extent not seen before. The

internationalisation of publishing and, in particular, the growth of a transatlantic cultural marketplace intensified the need, and the opportunities, for the law to impact on writing as never before.

Lawrence features less directly in the book than certain other writers – particularly Wilde, Joyce and Pound – but the travails he suffered in the publication of *The Rainbow*, *Women in Love* and *Lady Chatterley's Lover* are documented in some detail as totemic examples of the suppression of what were seen as transgressive texts, and the machinations which writers were forced to employ to get their works out into the public domain. Spoo's book is valuable for scholars of Lawrence in placing his struggles in a wider European and transatlantic context than is often acknowledged.

Robert Spoo is uniquely qualified to write this book. He is currently Chapman Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of Tulsa, but earlier in his career obtained his Ph.D. and taught for 10 years in the school of English at the same University. He edited the *James Joyce Quarterly* and has written extensively on Joyce and edited texts by Hilda Doolittle ('H. D.') and other modernist writers. He writes with great erudition and knowledge, but in a highly accessible way.

The book is as much a serious literary essay on modernism as it is a study of the law as a tool working with and against it. It offers profound insights into modernism's aspirations and achievements. Spoo observes in his Conclusion:

the argument over censorship of serious literature was never really resolved; it was simply cut short with the establishment of a constitutional test of obscenity in the United States and its statutory counterpart in Britain. We live with the salutary wound that obscene modernism never had its full day in court but rather was rescued, decades after its dominance, by a higher law that admits almost all speech to its protection. (151)

This is a very fine piece of popular scholarship which will satisfy the enquiries of literary and legal readers in equal measure.